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Jamie Love has worked full-time for the Center for Study of Responsive Law (CSRL) since 1990, and directs the Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech). CPTech is active in a number of issue areas, including intellectual property, telecommunications, privacy and electronic commerce, plus a variety of projects relating to antitrust enforcement and policy
Tuesday June 25
Jamie Love writes from Bucharest:
I'm here at the ICANN meeting, having arrived in the late afternoon. I briefly sat in on a meeting about the .org bids, and in another meeting organized by the "icannatlarge.com" organizing effort, which featured quite surprising presentations by Esther Dyson, followed by about 5 hours of gossip, drinks and food in the Marriott Grand Hotel, where the meeting is being held. . . .
Everything will lead up to the ICANN board meeting on Friday, and so far it looks like a depressing week. Most people say the June 20 "Blueprint for reform" document will be approved with a few changes on Friday. Among other things, ICANN is seeking to eliminate any possibility that there will ever be votes from the general public for anything, and doing its best to pass this off this as some consensus decision. ICANN also proposes to abandon an independent review board, and is seeking to adopt a statement on policy making that opens the door to just about anything.
The main thing here is about raising fears about what will happen if people don't go along with the ICANN "reform" proposal, no matter how bad it is. Many of these are seemingly inconsistent, and appeal as much to emotions as reason. Top on the list is the resentment toward the US for its current perceived control over the Internet DNS. Recent statements by members of Congress are being used to work people up over the US government taking over the ICANN functions. A large number of persons here find this a compelling reason to sign off on almost anything here, so that ICANN can (drum roll) sign a new MoU with the US DoC. Apparently having a really bad ICANN and DoC is held out as much better than DoC running the DNS without ICANN, as if this is something to worry about (plausible as a sustainable alternative), or the likely outcome of a failed ICANN.
Second on the list of feared things is the ITU, one possible replacement for the US DoC if there was international management of the DNS. The ITU is now receiving some member government support for taking a greater look a the DNS, particularly among developing countries. One of the issues here would be the redelegation issue for ccTLDs, an obvious role that ITU could play. A number of persons here express fear that this would lead to undesired national government involvement in the way some ccTLDs are run, on the theory that the current ambiguity of who controls the ccTLDs has prevented some countries from being too ambitious in regulating domestic Internet activity (or taking away lucrative franchises). Clearly some ccTLD operators are nervous about ICANN, and some ccTLDs are nervous about national governments. For those who are worried about domestic governments, they had hoped ICANN would provide a buffer.
I asked people, if you don't want the US DoC to have the DNS MoU, and you don't want the ITU, what do you want? The GAC? The answer among many was, nothing - they want ICANN without any government involvement. What seems missing from this wish is any evidence that governments will just turn everything over to ICANN and give ICANN a blank check to do whatever it wants, without any public accountability. Plus, ICANN is asking goverments to take a larger role, and they are.
Meanwhile, ICANN itself looks more and more like a cartel, or a quasi-government that seeks taxes and unwanted supervision of a cartel. Verisigin doesn't want an expansion of the name space, unless they can run everything, and neither do the ccTLDs. ICANN is doing approximately zero to introduce new TLDs. This problem is so obvious that ICANN is being warned that if can face antitrust law suits, an issue Joe Sims is advising the ICANN board on, I was told.
The at large organizing meeting was small and even I was surprised at how weak the support is here for elections of any kind. Esther Dyson and Denise Michel gave long presentations on how the board would not tolerate anything that involved the general public electing board members, and they described the new official ICANN "reform" version of the at large, which is a highly structured consultation system, that ICANN controls from the top, and which is not capable of holding votes from individuals. Esther went on about how unpopular elections and were in Asia and parts of Latin America, and how little support there was for elections among the non US members of the ICANN board.
At one point I said "look, in the White Paper, individuals were going to have 8 of 19 board seats. In Cairo this was reduced to 5 elected members. Then there was talk after Accra of having an at large as a supporting organization, with 3 board members. Now in the blueprint document, they will have 1 of 19 members of a nominating committee. Can you tell me how that 1 member will be chosen?" At this point, Dyson told me I should stop criticizing people, and be constructive. The answer, of course, is that the ICANN board cannot tolerate even the election of one person to a 19 member nominating committee. Apparently the mere existence of a system for having elections is a taboo, because it might lead to demands that elections be used for more important things, and could provide evidence that the public doesn't agree with the decisions of the hand picked board members. Of course, it is ironic that we having this meeting in Romania, and headed next to the People's Republic of China, to finish the job of eliminating democracy input or mechanisms to express dissent or popular opposition to ICANN Board policies.
Three members of the atlarge.com temporary steering committee (Vittorio Bertola, Izumi Aizu, and Wolfgang Kleinwaechter) and were at the at large meeting, and to my suprise, each of them signaled a willingness to accept the ICANN proposal to abandon any voting from individuals, in favor of a promise by ICANN to consulate with the public on issues. The Dyson, Michel suggestion is to be very docile, or the ICANN board won't even allow the consultation process. It is of course also relevant that the ICANN board wants to strip the ICANN General Assembly from the right to elect its own chair or vote on any motions.
I got into a debate with Denise about the value of pushing for a harder line on a role for the public in ICANN, mentioning the possibility that the US government could protect the rights of individuals in the ICANN process. Densie told us that she had 20 years of policy experience, and she knew exactly what was going to happen. She said: The US Senate would do nothing. The US House of Representatives would do nothing. The DoC would accept a slightly modified MoU in the fall, and the ICANN board would adopt the blueprint, without elections, in Shanghai.
Tonite Andy Mueller told me the ICANN board had one of its secret get togethers this evening, and agreed to approve the blueprint on Friday, with a few changes. The board is closing ranks, and trying only to cut whatever deals it needs to get the registries to go along. The $.25 per domain tax is not in the bag, according to some, while others say it will go through. There is an army of registry/registrars attending, but very few domain holders are here to complain about the tax, or to ask why they should have to pay, if they have no voice in the organization. The tax was just proposed on June 20. People have very low expectations that the US DoC will do anything to back consumer or civil society concerns about ICANN, and seem willing to give up on lots of things.
Wednesday June 26
I'm in the GA [General Assembly], and Denise, Esther [Dyson], Vittorio, and Izumi Aizu are on a panel to present a report on the at-large organizing effort.
Denise:
In Accra, the board has called for bottom up at large "structures." She reports $17k in contributions for at-large.org, and asks for more money. 16 "at large structures" have been created or designated by the effort. The implication is that all the groups who are listed on the at-large.org web page are on board with this new approach. There is some talk of creating a "structured role" in policy making, and input into the board decisions. She ends with a slide that says that greater involvement of governments and
establishment of 'meaningful' participation by individuals are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Esther then jumped in to say some people didn't support a greater role by governments.
Izumi Aizu and Vittorio Bertola appeared on the pane with Esther and Denise, and were generally supportive of the presentation by Esther or Denise.
Esther made a confident (almost smug) presentation. She said "I hope you walk away with an appreciation by the huge amount of progress that has been made." Earlier the at large was an "incoherent" idea, now it is something with .5 million people engaged through the 16 groups, and a structure in place to provide input. If ICANN becomes government controlled, it will become too powerful. It is really important that ICANN be controlled by users, by the participants, than by governments.
I just had my time at the mike from the floor... and went through the basics... The proposal for "at large structures" eliminates any votes by individuals. The White Paper gave individuals 8 of 19 board seats. In Cairo this was reduced to 5. In Accra, the 5 elected seats were phased out, but there was some hope that there would be an at large SO with maybe 3 seats on the board. Now you have an at large "structure" that at best can place 1 member on a 19 member nominating committee for some board seats, and no one can explain even how that 1 person is selected. To present this as a success for enhancing the power of individual internet users is absurd. I said it was not true, as implied by Denise Michel's presentation, that the groups listed as part of the at-large.org effort support the elimination of elections for ICANN board members or the proposals in the blueprint to dismantle democratic mechanisms (http://www.at-large.org/at-large-members.htm).
Denise said that CPSR was in fact supportive of the new "at large structures" approach, and had joined in submissions on this to the ICANN reform. I'll let Andy Oram and Hans Klein respond with any helpful clarificatons on this point.
====================
This was followed by a presentation on the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA), which recently concluded its elections. Alexander Svensson then asked a series of good questions, asking about how the elected members addressed issues of mission creep, why participation has declined in elections, and about "outreach" in the elections. I asked if there was fraud? And also, how much does it cost to audit the elections? The CIRA rep said that mission creep had not been a problem, the board had kept things fairly narrow, and that many people seemed satified with the CIRA operation, and were just didn't feel the need to be bother as long as things were working ok. The last CIRA election had about 1,000 voters. The CIRA has an external audit function, which ended up questioning about 100 votes, and ended up rejecting about 10. The cost of the audit and verification proceedure was about $3,000 for the June 2002 election.
==================
Well, the GA just concluded the discussion the blueprint proposals to eliminate elections for the GA chair to to prevent the GA from having votes on anything. Alexander Svensson asked for discussion. I was the *only* person to speak on this issue, and indeed, all morning I believe there has only between two or three other persons making any comments from the floor on anything. This has been the quietest GA meeting I have ever seen. No one else from the NCC or the at large spoke from the floor.
My point was that ICANN was seeking to eliminate every opportunity for ordinary people to register disagreement with the ICANN board positions. The elimination of at large elections was also part of this.
With respect to the GA votes on the two motions asking for a rebid (the blunt and more "diplomatic" version), Alexander did not mention either motion in his presentation, even though he had opposed having the votes earlier, on the grounds that it would lead to the elimination of the GA. [Interesting note: apparently Paul Twomey did not allow the GAC to discuss the GA vote during the GAC meeting, it has become an official non-event) Now we are in a situation where the GA will be changed in such a way that the
public will not be able to choose its leader, there will be no unmoderated discussions, and no votes on anything.
In my opinion, the value of the GA being able to elect its own leaders and to register its own independent views is to provide evidence that the ICANN board is out of step with the Internet community (when this happens), and to prevent the ICANN board from claiming a global consensus, when they don't have one. It's a saftey value and a modest system for accountability, which apparently is why is being eliminated.
Thursday June 27
Today was grueling, in part because no one is getting much
sleep and some tempers are short. Last evening the 11
.org bids were presented and today there was an ICANN
public forum, which lasted all day. I'll start with a few
words about the .org bid process.
DOT ORG
The various applications are quite detailed and take a
while to understand. Nearly all of them appear to be
mostly for the benefit of for profit companies, with an
occasional non-profit group or "policy body" as window
dressing, and maybe some true non-profits, as the IMS and
Internet Software Consortium appears to be. It cost $35k
just to provide a bid that most people thought was wired
for ISOC/Afilias from the beginning, but there were still
11 bids, all of them serious. The asset is worth a lot.
With a ~$5-6 per domain wholesale price and a cost of $1
to $2.5 to operate (according to some bidders) with 2.3
million registrations, I have heard estimates that .org is
worth $35 to $100+ million, for #35k is cheap.
There is a lot of talk about Verisign, Register.com
and maybe some others having a stake in more
than one bid. ICANN had a "consensus"
recommendation to award the bid to a non-profit, but at
the urging of Robert Blokzijl and other board members, the
ICANN board decided to eliminate the non-profit
requirement in Accra. Rober Blokzijl's wife worked for
Nuestar, one of the commercial bidders who is not teamed
up with a non-profit, and. now Blokzijl is named as
potential board member for Organic Names, another
commercial only bidder.. Someone said Blokzijl and Amadeu
Abril Abril have recused themselves on org at this
meeting, but Amadeu was questioning some of the bidders
anyway.
People who were working on this said the ICANN staff did a
decent job of following the ICANN Names Council
recommendation on the .org bid, which Milton Mueller
worked on (given the fact that the ICANN board got rid of
one of the primary requirements, that the bid be given to
non-profit).
I had raised concerns much earlier about the bidding
system, and had asked the ICANN staff and board to have a
two stage process, where it picked the non-profit first,
and then the non-profit picked the operator. My thinking
was that the non-profit would then have serious bargaining
power, and could get the operator for a competitive price,
maybe $1 or less per year per domain (creating an
interesting PR issue for the .com and other TLD registries
that charge up to $6 per name, wholesale).. The two
stage bid wasn't done, and as I had predicted, most bids
are financed and controlled by the operators, who will
make a bundle if the ICANN board likes them enough. Like
a lot of what goes on here it is about who makes money
off domain names.
Transparency issues
Well, I asked the ICANN board to stick to the unofficial
secret meetings, and stop holding official secret
meetings, a serous point that got a laugh. I also asked
them to follow the DNSO Names Council example and provide
MP3 files of their telephone meetings, which currently are
closed and not recorded. Next, I asked what ICANN was
spending on its litigation with Karl Auerbach over his
efforts to have access to the ICANN books, and was told I
could not have that information by Stuart Lynn. I sent
Stuart and Vint a follow up message and talked to Vint and
Hans, but apparently not only are the ICANN books secret,
the amount of money spent on lawyers to keep it secret is
also secret. One would like to complain to the GAC about
this, but they also hold secret meetings, give the ICANN
board secret documents, and won't meet with the public, so
this is hard to do.
At-Large
Back in the old days when democracy was considered a good
thing, "at large" membership meant you allowed individuals
to elect people to the board. The ICANN board was
supposed to have 9 elected members, then 5, then maybe 3,
and more recently, and far more pathetically, maybe 1 of
19 members of a nominating committee that elected only
part of the board. But apparently it can get even worse.
Now Esther Dyson, Denise Michel and Lyman Chapin are
pursuing a version of this that would seem more
appropriate for Romania or the USSR in the "old" days..
The new idea for the "at large" is to have ICANN determine
which groups "really" represent user interests, and to
manage their "constructive input" into the ICANN process,
sans elections for anything. Also, this apparently (in
Lyman Chapin's proposal) provides a nice opportunity for
the board to further stack the ICANN "NomCom", which is
the body that is supposed to pick ICANN board members.
and maybe other "bottom up" other bodies Apparently if
you pick your cronies but call them the "at large" you can
do this.
GAC
The GAC communique was long and detailed, and reflected a
highly unusual amount of dissent among GAC member
countries, almost as if they had minds of their own. The
scribe's notes will probably do justice to the fine points,
but allow me to briefly complain about my own GAC member,
the USG. Earlier (a while ago) Robin Layton had promised
many NGOs that the US would demand that ICANN address
civil society concerns. None of this was reflected in
the GAC communique. The fact that ICANN holds secret
meetings, refused to record its telephone board meetings,
doesn't disclose how it spends its money, has proposed
eliminating elections for individuals, won't allow the GA
to vote or elect its own chair, has transformed the "at
large" into a board/staffed managed PR exercise, is acting
more like a cartel than a consumer protection agency, and
has refused to implement the independent review process is
of course just great, as long as this is "private sector
led." DoC's Robin Layton has done a great job of avoiding
eye contact all week, so we haven't had a chance to
understand why we are getting zero action from DoC yet.
But I am informed that Robin is doing a good job of
keeping track of the FBI's concerns over WHOIS data, and
in close touch with US registry groups bidding on .org, so
I guess this is all a matter of priorities.
My own presentation to the GAC was cut short, as usual, by
Vint Cerf, who seems to have made a point this week of
interrupting me from making any tough criticism of the
ICANN process. Before Vint stopped me yet again from
expressing any criticism of ICANN, I was telling Paul
Towmey, the private sector former Australian government
employee (who reportedly has a business with former
Clinton administration official Ira Magaziner) but still
chairs the GAC, that we would like to know which
international policy making group is willing to talk to
civil society. It is quite clear that ICANN itself is not
making any space at all for civil society or consumer
concerns, and is only interested in business interests,
and so it is natural to ask, if not ICANN, who can we talk
to on matters such as intellectual property policy,
privacy, consumer protection, transparency, conflicts of
interest, or competition policy? The GAC communique
seemed to say that the GAC is the body that must control
all of these issues. Of course, the GAC is more closed to
civil society than any international body on earth, so
this makes us wonder, what are we supposed to do?
Nothing?
Evolution and Reform and Debate
It was long, it was interesting, it was a lot of going
along to get along, but not always, and it was a lot of
loose ends, particularly in terms of if the registries
would pay for ICANN.
My contribution had to be brief and focused. Vint Cerf
had cut me off every time I had talked on other issues,
and of course, he did it once again. I started with
thanking Alejandro Pisanty and Vint for their willingness
to engage us in the debate, and for making some real
changes in the really bad earlier proposals, to the
current confusingly vague elitist proposals. (actually
stated much more diplomatically). I noted the problems
with transparency, nuking elections of individuals while
keeping them for self selected business groups, and talked
a bit about the NomCom proposal (the group that will
actually elect ICANN board members),, and the decision to
strip the GA of the ability to elect its own leaders.
Then I switched gears and talked about mechanisms to
decentralize ICANN decision making
I noted that I had engaged in extensive discussions of
decentralization with Alejandro and Vint,on this topic,
which had been ignored completely in the June 20 report.
What we proposed was to acknowledge that there were few
benefits in a "one size fits all" DNS regulatory approach,
and that the process should reverse gears, and explore
ways that global coordination would be minimalist.
I said, for example, that ICANN
didn't need to do every regulatory function with new TLDS,
they only needed to address issues such as uniquenesses
of TLD strings, and whatever minimum standards for IP and
consumer protection policy that were considered necessary
from a global perspective, and to encourage others to
address as many issues as possible. In my "several
gatekeepers" comment, I talked about a scenario with about
7 or more mini-ICANNs, for different types of TLDs, each
with its own management structure and objectives. These
included a ccTLD group, 1 for treaty based organizations,
2 for commercial gTLDs groups, one for non-commercial, one
for academic and one more I can't remember, as starters.
The idea is to prevent a single group from becoming a
barrier to innovation or competition (exactly what has
happened in ICANN), and to create some competition among
groups, so that people could choose where to register
domains.
In this view, if you created competition among
"gatekeeopers", there would be incentives to "get it
right." Every busiess thaqt wanted to run a TLD string
would have to be adopted by a "mini-DNSO." Mini DNSOs that
had too much or too little consumer protection would not
be able to attract much market share. At this point, Vint cut me
off. As I walked away, Alejandro said that he could never
understand how the decentralization would work,
technically. If I had the opportunity to talk, I would
have discussed the many different ways that this could
work in terms of "solving" the uniqueness, issue,such as
first come first serve, lotteries or arbitration based
upon merit. But I am exhausted, and will turn in.
Earlier notes
In the public forum, Esther Dyson and Denise Michel just presented the at-large proposal. It is essentially a top down proposal, which allows organizations but not individuals to join, and will later develop a yet to be defined method of managing public input. The group not only did not propose the development of any mechanisms for votes by individuals, but its only suggested the board "consider" allowing this effort to "select" its own steering committee, and even then, under "Board-approved guidelines."
http://www.at-large.org/submission-to-evolution-and-reform-cmt.htm "We also recommend the Board consider allowing the At-Large Supporting Organization to select their Steering Committee and Board members under Board-approved guidelines/criteria."
Vint asked Denise if there would be methods of determining if the representatives of these groups actually represented the interests of their own users, and elaborated on his concern that they may only represent their own views. Denise said that they would be working on this issue, and Esther took the floor and discribe a system used by two merging corporations to confidentially poll (shareholders/stakeholders?). She also noted that when the results were contrary to what was desired, the poll results were not
made public, and then she suggested this polling firm might be available to provide services for the at-large structures consultation. It was not obvious why Esther had come up with this example, or where she was going with it. There was another exchange regarding Esther's comment that she hoped for the development of "parties" that cut across regions, prompting Vint to indicate that he hoped this would not happen, which prompted Esther to appear to back off, and Denise to emphasize their understanding that the process would be managed in such as way to help faciliate consensus.
There were several persons in the room who have worked on At Large efforts, including for example Aizu Izumi, Vittorio Bertola and Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, who were recently elected leaders for incannatlarge.com[1], Esther's previous at-large effort, and persons who were involved in the NAIS and ALSC efforts. Only two persons from the floor spoke on the Michel/Dyson report, myself and Harold Felt from Media Access Project, a US NGO that works on free speech issues.
I began by noting that we are meeting in Romania, a country that has only recently abandoned a governance system that limited political freedom. I said that I opposed the top down managed public particpation system that Denise and Esther were proposing, and that it was likely to be used to control and supress criticism of ICANN, and that if ICANN was to get the trust of the public and governments, there had to be mechanisms for people to freely express opposition to its policies, and to freely choose their own
leaders. I noted that ICANN is comfortable allowing a handful of select selected businesses represent all businesses on earth, but was unwilling to allow individuals to represent themselve directly, even in a structure that has little or no real power.
Vint said the board was short on time, and I was cut off. There will be further opportunties to discuss these issues later during the period to discuss the ERC report.
Harold Felt echoed some concerns about the at-large proposal.
[1] I was also elected to the "temporary" steering committee of icannatlarge.com. This body was supposed to hold a new election within 90 days. When it became clear that the panel was not going to hold a new election within the 90 days, I resigned.
CPTech statement on ICANN meeting
Friday - June 28, 2002
"I've posted a number of reports from here which reflect our views on the
ICANN meeting, but now that the Board has approved with June 20 Blueprint
plan, one week after anyone had seen it, it is time for governments to wake
up and look at what is being created. Despite countless letters from the US
Congress and contractual requirements to do so, ICANN is refusing to create
an independent review panel. ICANN is eliminating the ability of
individuals to freely debate issues with the ICANN system, even going so far
as to remove the ability of the public to elect their own leaders or have
votes in public forums that have no legal power. The original concept of a
public "at-large" membership that would elect board members has been
replaced with cynical top down staff/board managed PR exercise that will
ironically be used by the board to pack key committees,including the new
"NomCom" with cronies. Esther Dyson, who is making a career out of
protecting ICANN from its critics or government oversight is currently in
charge of deciding who "really" speaks for the public, and what constitutes
"constructive" input. This is a huge mistake, because Esther is completely
out of touch with the public, and would likely have no support in any
at-large strucutre that was democratic.
The board can freely meet in secret, and makes no efforts to even record
telephone board meetings, even when making decions that effect millions of
internet users, such as the delegation of .org, a "business" that is
probably worth $40 to $100 million. It will not provide its own board
members access to its books, or tell the public how much ICANN is spending
on litigation to prevent such access.
Everyone is searching to understand what the new "reformed" ICANN is, and it
appears to be partly like the unacccountable International Olympic Committee
(IOC), and partly like OPEC. The clique of insiders who control ICANN are
not willing to give up control, the unelected board members who promised
years ago to leave ICANN are still there, and the at-large elected members
will soon be moved off the board.
The GAC itself is part of the problem. It does not meet with the public, is
surounded by secrecy itself, and has done nothing at all to address the
transparency or accountability issues for itself or ICANN. The member
countries for the GAC should hold public consultations at home and also
jointly to allow civil society to have a voice. The Internet is too
important, ICANN's proposals for policy making authority too sweeping and
ambitious, and the costs of cartel like activity too high to allow ICANN to
operate outside of all known systems of accountablity.
Most important, the GAC and the member countries have to allow new ideas for
DNS management to be given a fair hearing, the subject of the last motions
the ICANN General Assembly was permited to vote on. At yesterday's meeting
the ICANN board said it did not understand how it could decentralize policy
making, as if there were some technical hurdles it could not overcome. This
of course is no more true than saying the entire global phone system should
be regulated by a single agency just become someone has to allocate country
codes for phones. The entire DNS management issue needs to be much more
decentralized, and the groups that act as gatekeepers to new TLDs should be
spit up and put into a new framework that would have pro-competitive
incentives, and give the public a choice and also a chance to create TLDs
that they can control themselves. We expect to participate in a meeting on
these and other ICANN issues on September 9-10 in Geneva, and we ask others
who are interested in serious policy discussions about ICANN to also
participate."
Jamie
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